| On the Outside Looking in:
Paul Johnson's America
Historian Ken Burns delivered an address that aired on
C-SPAN last month. The Granite state scholar’s speech wasn’t
about his slanted PBS series, The Civil War. Nor did he
focus on Baseball, his error-filled documentary in
which the national pastime is significant primarily because of
its relationship to race relations and labor unions. Instead,
a ranting Burns unloaded a semi-hysterical stump speech at a
campaign rally for Al Gore. For Burns, there is no difference
in campaigning and manufacturing pop-histories for television.
It’s all activism after all.
The political bent of historians can be witnessed in overt
acts like electioneering of the sort Burns took part. It can
be more subtle, like Arthur Schlesinger’s ranking of the
Presidents, in which he polls historians sympathetic to his
outlook—retired politicians Mario Cuomo and Paul Simon
participated in the most recent survey—ensuring his desired
conclusions upon the selection of the participants.
Recent examinations of the political affiliations of
college professors, too, demonstrate an extreme bias among
historians. Stanford’s department of history houses 22
Democrats and two Republicans. Cornell has 29 Democrats and
zero Republicans. Dartmouth also pitches a shutout, with 10
professors registered as Democrats.
To get a balanced account of our past, it has almost
reached the point where one must avoid the American academy
entirely. A History of the American People, the latest
offering from Paul Johnson—he’s a Brit, he’s not an
academic—delivers the kind of history not commonly found on
the reading lists of American college professors. As he notes
in the preface, "I have not bowed to current academic nostrums
about nomenclature or accepted the fly-blown philacteries of
Political Correctness." In doing so, he is able to tackle
subjects oft ignored by academic histories, e.g., religious
and industrial history.
From the time the Mayflower landed at Plymouth Rock,
religion was to play a central role in American life. Johnson
notes the religious origins of Harvard, Yale, Princeton, and
other institutions of higher learning older than the Republic
itself. "The Great Awakening," Johnson maintains, was "the
proto-revolutionary event, the formative moment in American
history, preceding the political drive for independence and
making it possible."
"The essential difference between the American Revolution
and the French Revolution," asserts Johnson, "is that the
American Revolution, in its origins, was a religious event,
whereas the French Revolution was an anti-religious event.
That fact was to shape the American Revolution from start to
finish and determine the nature of the independent state it
brought into being."
Johnson’s independent streak is illustrated in his
even-handed treatment of relations between the numerous Indian
tribes and an expansionary America. "The Indians were not
murderous savages, who ought either to be detribalized and
assimilated completely...or exterminated," he observes, "Nor
were they sophisticated-primitive innocents, living in utopian
and preservationist communities, brutally disturbed by cruel
and heedless invaders of European extraction."
Johnson reports the many atrocities carried out by whites
against Indians. Rare among chroniclers, he also notes the
many atrocities carried out by Indians against whites.
"Let the white race perish!" proclaimed Tecumseh, a Shawnee
chief idolized in many current textbooks. "Burn their
dwellings—destroy their stock—slay their wives and children
that their very breed may perish! War now! War always! War on
the living! War on the dead!"
Following Tecumseh’s rhetoric, to no one’s surprise, his
followers went on the warpath. At the Deep South outpost of
Fort Mims, more than 1,000 Creeks murdered 553 men, women, and
children. Only fifteen were able to escape and the Indians
exited with 250 scalps. Hate speech, as we are incessantly
reminded, has consequences.
It is significant that the author sees the period between
the Revolution and the presidency of Abraham Lincoln as
something more than just a preface to Civil War. Also of
importance is his rejection of the latter third of the 19th
century being labeled as a time of "robber barons" or a
"gilded age." Instead, Johnson sees it as a time of great
economic progress that would eventually give rise to the likes
of Thomas Edison, the Wright Brothers, and Henry Ford.
"Between 1859 and 1914," observes Johnson, "America
increased its output of manufactured goods, in value, no less
than eighteen times." With tariffs at the gates and a free
market within, America jumped from fourth- to first-place in
manufacturing output.
Though a time of great plenty, it was not an era of greed.
When Andrew Carnegie wrote, "The man who dies rich, dies
disgraced," he was not engaged in empty sloganeering. The
Scottish immigrant spent more than $350 million on charitable
causes, including millions for the construction of more than
2,800 public libraries. Nor was Carnegie alone among "robber
barons" in using private fortune for public good. It was
Colonel Jim Fisk who came to the rescue of Chicago after its
great fire of 1871. Likewise, railroad magnate Edward Henry
Harriman heaped generosity upon San Francisco following the
infamous earthquake of 1906. Leland Stanford, Daniel Drew, and
Cornelius Vanderbilt—derisively labeled "robber barons" by the
denizens of academia today—all gave more than their surnames
to establish famous centers of learning.
Yet the greatest gift these men gave the public were more
jobs at escalating wages, reduced costs for consumers, and
better products and services. It is because they lived as
walking billboards to the success of the capitalist
system—nearly all of the major industrialists were self-made
men—that they have been denigrated by historians so hostile to
the free market.
If the Presidents of the Industrial Age seem mediocre in
comparison to the great tycoons, it is because, with the
exception of Grover Cleveland, they were. Johnson’s views of
the Presidents—from Washington through Clinton—leaves the
reader with little room to interpret his opinions.
Madison’s war excursions were "foolish," "irresponsible and
reckless," and based on "endless confusion." Wilson "first
introduced America to big, benevolent government," he based
his war effort on "propaganda," and his administration "ended
in deception and failure." Kennedy was "one of the biggest
frauds in American political history," "a political huckster,"
and "a propagandist rather than a serious statesman." The
election of 1960 was a fix that "Nixon probably won by about
250,000" votes.
Special contempt is reserved for Herbert Hoover and
Franklin Roosevelt. The author notes that "both
administrations, by their meddlesome activism, impeded a
natural recovery," with regard to the Great Depression. "We
didn’t admit it at the time," Roosevelt advisor Rex Tugwell
permitted in 1974, "but practically the whole New Deal was
extrapolated from programs that Hoover started." Hoover
increased government spending dramatically and ran up huge
deficits. He slashed taxes then raised them to almost
unprecedented levels. This incoherent, anarchic economic
policy was what Roosevelt was to adopt and christen "the New
Deal." Consequently, the country remained mired in a deep
depression through much of the decade.
Roosevelt’s handling of foreign policy was in many respects
even more disastrous. "Stalin has got the President in his
pocket," noted Sir Alan Brooke, chairman of the British Chiefs
of Staff. FDR, in a moment of extreme naivete, is quoted on
Stalin: "I think that if I give him everything I possibly can
and ask nothing from him in return, noblesse oblige, he
won’t try to annex anything and will work with me for a world
of democracy and peace." Johnson adds, "what FDR, over
Churchill’s protests, gave to Stalin was not his to give."
A History of the American People diverges most from the
current scholarship emanating from higher education in its
defense of Warren Harding and Calvin Coolidge. Upon taking
office, Harding slashed taxes and cut government expenditures
by 40%. Coolidge remained on this course. As a result of their
laissez-faire policies, both presidents are damned by an
intelligentsia that genuflects to the planned economy. The
1920s, Johnson declares, were "probably the most enjoyable
decade in American history." Per capita income rose by more
than 25% in the eight years of the Harding-Coolidge
presidencies. The misery index was at its lowest point in U.S.
history. To blame the Great Depression on the wealth of the
Harding-Coolidge years is to ignore the fact that economic
collapse occurred on a worldwide scale.
A History of the American People closes with a charge
of optimism. America "is a human achievement without
parallel," the text proclaims. "It is still the first, best
hope for the human race," Johnson professes. "Looking back on
its past, and forward to its future, the auguries are that it
will not disappoint an expectant humanity."
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